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ABSTRACT  
This paper outlines a critical conception of the corporation which is grounded in respect for 
the intrinsic worth of stakeholders, and where the normative product of an organisation is 
assessed by the extent to which it promotes human dignity. The theoretical development relies 
upon an integration of meaningfulness and mutuality, where experiencing meaningfulness is a 
fundamental human need which is satisfied through our membership of organisations structured 
by the values and principles of mutuality. A critical theory of the corporation includes the 
following elements: a standard for evaluating organisations; a specific normative content for 
internal organising; an empirical grounding which connects to social realities; and an objective 
of human emancipation. Using a theoretical integration of meaningfulness and mutuality to 
provide normative substance, the standard is supplied by ethical capacity (understood as 
relational quality, deliberative voice and value pluralism); normative content by intrinsic worth; 
empirical validity by evidence of a fundamental need for meaning; and emancipatory objective 
by harnessing organisational purpose to the production of the common good. Respecting 
intrinsic worth is central to the activation of meaningfulness by mutual organisation, and is 
realised through voice practices which involve members in valuing, purposing and acting 
together.  
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Since the financial crisis in 2008, there have been growing concerns that key institutions 
vital to social, environmental and economic well-being are ill-equipped to deliver their 
purposes.  From banks to hospitals, public and private organisations have demonstrated 
behaviour which is misguided, self-serving and corrupt. One reason for continued weakness in 
the ethical capacity of organisations is that we lack a shared understanding of the normative 
characteristics of organisations capable of promoting the good for individuals, communities 
and societies. In other words, we are in need of a critical theory of the corporation to guide 
institutional redesign. Another reason is that our account of human beings in organisations is 
constrained by a myopic view of individuals as predominantly self-interested. Ostrom (2010) 
argues that economics needs a better theory of human behaviour, one which recognises the 
relational dimensions of action, specifically the understanding that people are learning and 
norm-adopting individuals (ibid: 21). This is because people are not mere bundles of 
preferences to be mediated by price, but rather are creators, maintainers and repairers of the 
collective values which constitute our ‘common-pool resources’ (ibid: 24). Dewey (1939: 2) 
identifies the centrality of values for human action: ‘all deliberate, all planned human conduct, 
personal and collective, seems to be influenced, if not controlled, by estimates of value or worth 
of ends to be attained’. Yet, Jensen (2008) says that the creation and operation of values in 
groups, companies and societies  is an area about which we know ‘almost nothing’, prompting 
him to propose that ‘integrity’, as a component of values-leadership, must now be considered 
a factor in production. Finally, Donaldson (2008) argues that we need a ‘Normative Revolution’ 
which will establish ‘the normative basis of markets in general, and for the normative basis of 
the corporation’ (ibid: 174). He goes on to say that the time has arrived when ‘managers must 
ascribe some intrinsic worth to stakeholders’ (ibid: 175) such that ‘human beings have value in 
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themselves’ (ibid.). In sum, we require a positive critical theory of the corporation which makes 
recognising the intrinsic worth of human beings, including their dignity and developmental 
potential, constitutive of organisational purpose.  
  
A CRITICAL CONCEPTION OF THE CORPORATION  
I shall outline a critical conception of the corporation which is grounded in respect for the 
intrinsic worth of their members, and where the normative product of organisations is assessed 
by the extent to which they enhance human dignity by enabling people to live lives they have 
reason to value. I shall proceed by way of a theoretical integration of meaningfulness and 
mutuality, where meaningfulness is a fundamental human need which is fostered through our 
membership of organisations structured by the values and principles of mutuality (Yeoman,  
2014a; 2014b). With respect to meaningfulness, I draw upon Susan Wolf’s (2010) bipartite 
value of meaningfulness to argue that the individual experience of meaningfulness depends 
upon the formation and exercise of human capabilities for objective valuing and subjective 
attachment, as well as being recognised as an equal co-authority in meaning-making (Yeoman,  
2014b). With respect to mutuality, I make use of John Rawls’s (1999) Theory of Justice to 
identify three dimensions of mutuality – bargaining, cooperating and becoming – necessary for 
sustaining a system of social cooperation. I bring meaningfulness and mutuality together by 
describing how mutual organisation promotes the formation of the relevant capabilities for 
meaningfulness which we develop by being involved with worthwhile purposes and things of 
value, and against which we judge our lives to be worth living. These capabilities are 
manifested in appropriately designed institutions with mutual characteristics, where mutuality 
is an organising philosophy which uses voice practices to institutionalise power-sharing. 
Wegge et al (2010) identify the importance of ‘structurally anchored organisational democracy’ 
for promoting a positive socio-moral climate and associated ethical behaviours where 
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organisational democracy means ‘broad-based and institutionalised employee influence 
processes that are not adhoc or occasional in nature’ (ibid: 162). Establishing the basis for a 
stable system of organisational democracy implies ‘the constructive participation of all 
organisational members in the creation and implementation of organisational values, norms and 
rules’ (Verdofer et al, 2012). This requires a voice system capable of combining democratic 
authorisation at the level of the organisation with participatory practices at the level of the 
task/individual (Yeoman, 2014a; cf. McMahon, 1994). Such a voice system is institutionalised 
and activated in organisations governed by the mutuality principle.  
By excavating dimensions of mutuality from Rawlsian justice applied to society as a system 
of social cooperation, I show that mutuality can be conceptualised as an organising philosophy 
rooted in a relational ethics, requiring us to attend to how organisations promote or inhibit 
relational quality. In a critical conception of the corporation attentive to intrinsic worth, 
relational quality supplies the standard for assessing desirable and undesirable states of affairs. 
Furthermore, mutual organisation establishes the relational conditions for exercising the 
capabilities for meaningfulness, and thereby experience ourselves as dignified persons. In this 
way, mutuality unlocks meaningfulness by supplying a resource of purposes, values and 
meanings which people adopt into the meaningfulness of their lives.  
A Theoretical Integration of Meaningfulness and Mutuality  
A theoretical integration of meaningfulness and mutuality offers fresh perspectives upon a 
critical theory of the corporation. I shall show that the manifestation of meaningfulness depends 
upon institutional arrangements which structure action contexts according to specific relational 
characteristics of interdependence, inclusiveness, cooperation and human values such as 
equality, fairness, care, respect and dignity. Mutuality is an organising philosophy which 
contains the normative resources for designing institutions which are generative of 
relationships correctly structured to promote meaningfulness. In particular, mutuality and 
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meaningfulness share fundamental values of autonomy, freedom and dignity which are 
consistent with respecting the intrinsic worth of the organisation’s members (Yeoman, 2014a). 
The capacity to experience ourselves as intrinsically valuable depends upon a reciprocal ability 
to recognise the intrinsic value of others. Hence, the best way for individuals to incorporate 
their own, and others, intrinsic worth into the meaningfulness of their lives is be involved with 
objects which are judged to have independent value (cf. Wolf, 2010). Establishing the nature 
of independent value is a relational, intersubjective process, created when we mobilise the 
interactive ‘space between’ (Buber, 1970) each other, objects and organisations: ‘Taking a 
relational orientation suggests that the real work of the human organization occurs within the 
space of interaction between its members’ (Bradbury & Lichtenstein, 2000: 551). Relationally 
rich dialogic spaces facilitate our appropriation of positive values into stable self-identities. 
Therefore, in order to experience meaningfulness, most of us benefit from belonging to social 
structures where the core social practice for values appropriation is ‘voice’, which I understand 
as sharing with the others the responsibility and authority for forming the purpose, making the 
rules and implementing the tasks necessary for promoting the good of worthy objects, or those 
objects for the sake of which the organisation exists.   
Since voice depends upon the equal co-authority of each member, the ideal-type of mutual 
organisation is a power-sharing arrangement, architected by social practices of valuing, 
purposing and acting. Co-owned organisations, such as employee-owned businesses, mutuals 
and cooperatives, are the most familiar expressions of mutuality. However, the values, 
principles and practices of mutuality may be applied to other ownership types, and even to 
system level collaborations and globalised supply chains. The common theme is understanding 
that the normatively productive corporation is a carrier of values, purposes and meanings, 
where correctly configured relationships aim at realising the common good through means 
which are themselves generative of human goods, such as meaningful work. This approach 
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provides a normative account of the corporation which will equip us in identifying good 
organisations, as well as specifying what is needed to build ethical capacity.   
INTRINSIC WORTH IN A CRITICAL THEORY OF THE CORPORATION  
Marx (1843) defined critical theory as ‘the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of 
the age’ (Fraser, 1985). For Horkheimer (1972: 246), the aim of critical theory is to ‘create a 
world which satisfies the needs and powers’ of human beings through democratic means, since  
‘all conditions of social life that are controllable by human beings depend on real consensus’ 
(ibid: 249–250). Critical social theory is a ‘mode of reflection that looks critically at processes 
of social development from the point of view of the obstacles they pose for human flourishing’ 
(Cooke, 2004: 418). In calling for a critical conception of work, Smith (2009: 47-53) argues 
that an ethically relevant critical theory will define a standard for distinguishing between 
different kinds of work; possess normative content (Honneth, 1995) enabling critical 
evaluation; demonstrate empirical validity as a fact about the world; and indicate the direction 
of social and individual emancipation. At an institutional level, Keat (2009: 360) argues for a 
‘comparative institutional ethics’ capable of fostering ethical reasoning which will critically 
evaluate ‘‘what kinds of lives can be lived in our society and are there better possibilities?’ This 
would involve inquiring into what kinds of goods are needed to enable the variety of lives 
judged to be valuable or worthwhile, where the range of valuable lives is sufficiently wide, and 
accessible, to allow people to express their subjective understanding of what is good.   
In their recent important paper outlining a theory of business, Donaldson & Walsh (2015: 
188) appraise business success using the four features of purpose, accountability, control and 
conduct. They identify the ‘intrinsic worth’ of participants with dignity or being ‘treated with 
respect, compatible with each person’s inherent worth’ which is evaluated by establishing a 
‘dignity threshold’ or minimal level of respect (ibid.). I propose that a specifically critical 
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theory of the corporation will include the following elements: a standard for evaluating 
organisations; a specific normative content for internal organising; an empirical grounding 
which connects to social realities; and an objective of human emancipation. In a theoretical 
integration of meaningfulness and mutuality, the standard is supplied by ethical capacity 
(understood in terms of relational quality, deliberative voice and value pluralism); normative 
content by intrinsic worth; empirical validity by evidence of a fundamental need for meaning; 
and emancipatory objective by harnessing organisational purpose to the production of the 
common good. In collective action contexts which integrate meaningfulness and mutuality, 
dignity ‘depends upon our having a sense of our value as particular persons with lives of our 
own to lead’ (Yeoman, 2014b: 122). Generalised respect recognition (Honneth, 1995), 
however, can fall into the error of treating individual persons merely as universal types. Rather, 
the status and experience of being a dignified person depends upon our having confidence that 
‘one’s life has value in all its everyday ordinariness – in the monotony, grime, inadequacy and 
despair as well as in the shining moments of achievement’ (Dillon, 1995: 299). In other words, 
it is being positively acknowledged in the distinctiveness of our individual lives which grounds 
a sense of dignity - although recognising that each life is unavoidably bound up with others, 
where the variations and richness of such contribute to distinctiveness. The normatively 
productive organisation attends to dignity by contributing to, and involving its members in, the 
creation of goods (material and immaterial) which make possible a plurality of lives considered 
to be worth living. These goods include values, norms and meanings; living things such as 
persons, plants and animals; and a multitude of objects and experiences. Specific organisational 
goals aimed at the production of goods are nested in the broader ‘ultimate purpose’ of 
contributing to the common good (Fontrodona & Sison, 2006). Hence, the individual 
experience of meaningfulness depends upon being involved in activities, projects and practices 
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which produce local and ultimate goods. These activities, projects and activities are manifested 
in normatively productive organisations with high levels of ethical capacity, constituted by 
relational quality, deliberative voice and value pluralism.  
Garrouste & Saussier (2005) argue that a theory of the firm must include an account of the 
nature and boundary of the firm; the internal structure of the firm; and the relations between 
firms and markets. Contemporary organisations are challenged in all three aspects: boundaries 
are difficult to describe and maintain because firms are becoming increasingly extended or 
networked (Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002); the internal structure of the firm is characterised by 
diversity and multiple stakeholders (Freeman, 1984); and, in a ‘shared power, no-one-wholly-
in-charge world’ (Crosby & Bryson, 2010: 211), firm-market relationships do not conform to 
a simple competitive principle, but rather are determined by the need for collaboration and 
cooperation, as well as the fact of systemic inter-dependence. The world is pluralist, but 
standard theories of the firm such as the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’ (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1985) remain unitary. By this I mean, standard theories assume that the purpose 
of the firm is narrow and singular, and that effective collective action requires a unity of 
interests between the active agents. Consequently, differences over purpose, values and ways 
of living must be extinguished. Nelson (2003) identifies how the unitary firm acknowledges 
only a limited range of ‘motivations and relations’, such that: ‘the firm is just thought of as a 
unit, and it is simply presumed that all parts of it will work smoothly towards the goal of profit 
maximisation’ (ibid: 91). Differences are dissolved through negotiation, socialisation and 
suppression. This allows theorists such as Boatright (2002) to argue that stakeholder theory is 
consistent with contract theory because all stakeholders have some ‘some asset in return for 
some gain’ which means that ‘all stakeholders are regarded as contractors with the firm, with 
their rights determined through bargaining’. However, this also maintains the primacy of 
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ontological individualism and self-interest, issuing in collective purpose as profit maximisation 
and relationships as predominantly transactional.   
  
A Pluralist Theory of the Firm  
In unitary theories of the corporation, motives and actions of stakeholders are assumed to 
align, for practical purposes, with management determined goals. Yet modern organisations are 
increasingly dependent upon multiple actors who possess plural values and conceptions of 
living, and who are related to one another through system complexity and competing claims. 
To address this social reality, we need a pluralist theory of the firm where purpose arises from 
the diverse needs and interests of members, filtered through an evaluation of how the 
organisation contributes to the common good. A pluralist theory of the corporation will account 
for organisational structures in which people are relational and cooperative, dissent and 
difference are respected, and directors are integrators and communicators. The corporation is 
understood to be multi-stakeholder, relational and systemically embedded, where 
organisational purpose is expressed as ‘whole purpose’, or an integration of different parts 
which must be continually adjusted, conciliated, traded-off and synthesised. This goes beyond 
conceptualising the corporation as a bargaining game, even when conducted under conditions 
of enlightened stakeholder management which aims at mutual gains. Rather, the corporation is 
re-imagined as a polyvocal, dispersed power entity, where the pattern of entitlements and 
obligations is reordered so that participation in purposing and acting through voice is no longer 
in the gift of managers - at risk of arbitrary withdrawal - but is an entitlement which managers 
are obliged to provide.   
Moreover, a pluralist theory needs to be a specifically critical theory, allowing us to 
distinguish between desirable and undesirable states of affairs from the perspectives of different 
stakeholders; for example, by illuminating the normative characteristics of relationships 
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between individuals and organisations, organisations and organisations, and organisations and 
society. For stakeholders, prioritisation of their claims may be considered from various moral 
and pragmatic standpoints, such as degree/risk of harm (negative), opportunities for personal 
and collective development (positive), recognition of their distinctive claims as human beings 
(intrinsic worth). Because they contribute important resources, stakeholders are sources of 
instrumental value (Verbeke & Tung, 2013). However, they are also sources of intrinsic worth, 
related to one another through shared needs and common vulnerabilities. They are ‘whole, fully 
integrated human beings, with names, faces, families and pasts’ (Freeman, 2008). A pluralist 
theory of the corporation will therefore incorporate a relational ontology as the basis for 
understanding the intrinsic worth of persons as value bearers and value creators. In the Kantian 
formulation, human beings have intrinsic worth which means that they are not to be treated as 
a means only, but also as ends-in-themselves (Korsegaard, 1996). Kant understood human 
beings as ends-in-themselves to be rational and reason-giving individuals. In a theoretical 
integration of meaningfulness and mutuality, they are also relational and inter-subjective. With 
respect to organisational purpose, people (suppliers, workers and customers) are the 
instruments through which purpose is achieved. However, they are not passive instrumentum 
vocale to be moved about at the will of managers or shareholders, but in their capacity as value-
creators are generative of purpose, and moreover in their status as value-bearers are the objects 
of purpose, or one of the reasons why the organisation exists.    
THE VALUE OF MEANINGFULNESS  
In a critical conception of the corporation grounded in a theoretical integration of 
meaningfulness and mutuality, prospects for meaningfulness depend upon the maintenance of 
a rich value pluralism, or a common resources of meanings and values which are taken up, 
through structured association architected by mutual organisation, into the meaningfulness of 
lives (Yeoman, 2014a). Through the provision of a plurality of values and meanings, 
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normatively productive organisations enable their members to craft a wide variety of lives. 
Frankl (2004) says that the meaningfulness is stitched together from ordinary, everyday 
experiences towards which we adopt positive and active orientations: ‘The perception of 
meaning boils down to becoming aware of a possibility against the background of reality, or, 
more simply, becoming aware of what can be done about a given situation’ (ibid: 84).   
Accounts of meaningfulness may be objective, subjective or hybrid. Objective accounts 
argue that meaningfulness arises from being involved in projects and activities which are larger 
than ourselves, and which are more or less meaningful depending upon the extent to which they 
generate worthwhile outcomes: ‘your life is meaningful to the extent that you actively 
contribute to making the world a better place or to promoting “the good.”’ (Campbell & 
Nyholm, 2014: 3). Subjective accounts consider how meaningfulness is experienced by the 
individual whose life it is: ‘life or activity is meaningful to the extent that the individual in 
question takes satisfaction in it or derives a sense of fulfilment from it’ (Campbell & Nyholm, 
2014: 5). Subjective accounts of meaningfulness differentiate satisfaction which assessed by 
an individual’s own satisfaction and sense of fulfilment from aim-fulfilment in which ‘Your life 
has meaning just if, and to the extent that, you achieve the aims that you devote it to freely and 
competently’ (Luper 2014). Meaningfulness, however, cannot be straightforwardly derived 
from the achievement of aims, since many of us are unsuccessful in reaching our objects. 
Rather, as Wolf (2010) argues, simply being involved with worthwhile aims may be sufficient 
for meaningfulness, apart from the extent to which they are achieved.   
Objective and subjective accounts do not exhaust all the ways in which we may consider 
something to be meaningful. Consequently, some philosophers, notably Susan Wolf (2010), 
propose a hybrid account which integrates objective and subjective elements of 
meaningfulness. Wolf identifies the value of meaningfulness to be distinct from the values of 
duty or welfare, and to be aimed at independently valuable objectives which we find to be 
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affectively engaging: ‘subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness’ (Wolf 2010: 9).  Raz 
(2001; 2003) also identifies the simultaneous presence of objective and subjective dimensions 
when he identifies the dual movement of judging and feeling in the formation of personal 
meaning. He argues that, as a consequence of affective appropriation, we acknowledge values 
as ours subjectively because of the particular place they have within our lives which gives us 
reasons to regard our life as worthwhile; but we also acknowledge values as ours objectively 
because our judgement upon their independent value confirms that we are right to give them 
such prominence in our lives (see also, Wolf, 2010).   
For Wolf (2010), meaningfulness is ‘felt to answer to a certain kind of human need’ (Wolf, 
2010: 26), where we experience the need for meaningfulness as urgent and inescapable, because 
it addresses vital human interests which are necessary for human flourishing:   
‘Our interest in being able to see our lives as worthwhile from some point of view 
external to ourselves, and our interest in being able to see ourselves as part of an at 
least notional community that can understand us and that to some degree shares our 
point of view, then, seems to me to be pervasive if not universal. By engaging in 
projects of independent value, by protecting, preserving, creating, and realizing value 
the source of which lies outside of ourselves, we can satisfy these interests’ (ibid: 31).  
Wolf describes a bipartite value of meaningfulness which unites objective valuation with 
subjective satisfaction: ‘meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective 
attractiveness’ (ibid: 9), where the experience of meaningfulness is more likely to occur when 
a person becomes actively connected to a worthy object, or something or someone of value, 
such that they are ‘gripped, excited, involved by it’ (Wolf, 1997a: 208). She distinguishes the 
bipartite value of meaningfulness from morality (duty) or happiness (feelings of goodness), 
where meaningfulness is ‘a category of value that is not reducible to happiness or morality, and 
that is realized by loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them in a positive way’ 
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(Wolf, 2010: 13). Wolf argues that a bipartite value for meaningfulness is necessary because 
the morality/self-interest distinction fails to describe all that is normatively significant about 
our actions and our relations. In particular, the morality/self-interest distinction is unable to 
account for the special ties we feel towards our ‘ground projects’ – projects which help us to 
answer the question ‘what reasons do we have for living?’ (Wolf, 2010: 56). Williams (1981) 
refers to ground projects as ‘closely related to [one’s] existence and [...] to a significant degree 
give meaning to [one’s] life’ (ibid: 12). The special significance for meaningfulness of ground 
projects comes from how they organise our values and frame our practical identities. Having 
ground projects provides us with the material for the narrative formation of our lives, directing 
us to the responsibilities we have to act appropriately towards the objects for the sake of which 
such projects exist. Thus, meaningfulness does not come from the aggregation of individual 
goods, but from long-lasting, appropriate orientations towards particular objects, such as 
persons, animals, or activities, where orientations may be judged to be appropriate when they 
point us towards the responsibilities we have to further the good of those objects.  
  
Integrating Objective and Subjective Dimensions of Meaningfulness  
Wolf’s bipartite value of meaningfulness integrates objective and subjective dimensions 
when affective feelings of attachment are united to an assessment of the worthiness of the 
object. This implies that what we subjectively feel to be meaningful must be joined to 
considerations of what is of independent value: ‘A meaningful life is a life that a.) the subject 
finds fulfilling, and b.) contributes to or connects positively with something the value of which 
has its source outside the subject’ (ibid: 20). Although Wolf identifies that the ‘bipartite’ value 
of meaningfulness is constituted by an integration of objective and subjective dimensions, she 
does not provide an account of the relevant processes for facilitating meaningfulness. In order 
to experience the value of meaningfulness, Yeoman (2014a) argues that we need to become 
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valuers, invested with the capacity to recognise what has objective worth and to appropriate 
positive values to our lives. To this end, we need to form capabilities and possess status, where 
the relevant capabilities of objective judging and affective appropriation are fostered by 
institutional arrangements which enact respectful, equal and dignified relationships. Through 
objective judging, we assess the legitimacy of our affective attachment to worthy objects by 
asking how well we are doing in promoting the good for those objects. This demands an ‘active 
orientation of one’s self to the particular value of worthy objects’ (Yeoman, 2014a: 34). Thus, 
how ground projects add to the meaning content of a life is not given automatically by the 
objective values they embody. Although a project may be acknowledged by all as valuable, this 
does not mean that the individual doing the project will have an affective sense of that project 
being meaningful. How we resolve this puzzle of objective and subjective dimensions of 
meaningfulness in our own lives depends upon the resources made available to us in our most 
important associations. We are more likely to acquire such resources when we belong to 
organisations which aim at worthy purposes through means which generate locally valuable 
goods for all its members.  
THE PURPOSE OF THE CORPORATION  
I argue that a critical conception of the corporation requires an understanding of ‘whole 
purpose’ which transcends the triple bottom line, hybridity or multiple purposes, but does not 
reduce to singularity. Rather, the whole purpose of the organisation incorporates values, 
intentions, goals and ends through a collectively achieved integration of objective and 
subjective dimensions of meaningfulness which maintains productive tensions by fostering 
value pluralism as a resource for adaptation, innovation and change. Consequently, properly 
constructed whole purpose, encompassing local and ultimate goods, provides us with 
compelling reasons to act. An Aristotelian understanding of telos describes ultimate purpose as 
‘that for the sake of which’ something exists (see Cameron, 2010). Purposes shape the 
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experience of meaningfulness in organisations when we have the opportunity to become 
actively involved with objects of independent value, where active involvement includes sharing 
with others the responsibility for shaping purposes, maintaining values and adopting correct 
orientations: ‘to value something is to have a complex of positive attitudes towards it, governed 
by distinct standards for perception, emotion, deliberation, desire, and conduct’ (Anderson, 
1993: 2). Purposes and goals are constitutive of meaningfulness when they aim at the good for 
objects which are worthy of our human effort. Such purposes may be local or transcendent, 
enduring or transient, but they may not be futile, trivial or pointless. However, no life is reduced 
solely to the achievement of purpose or goals, no matter how worthwhile. As I have already 
discussed, where the prospects of achievement are limited or we are subject to ill-luck in our 
aims, we may still secure meaningfulness by simply being involved with things of value. 
Moreover, intentional action may be both teleological or goal-directed and nonteleological or 
values-driven. In organisational studies influenced by Aristotelian understandings of the telos, 
purposeful action is often described as goal-oriented, whereby we act to secure some end 
(Rosso et al., 2010; May et al., 2004). However, Stoker (1981) argues that not all action is goal-
directed, since we also act ‘from or out of’ some particular source of values or meanings (ibid.). 
Thorpe (2008) describes such non-teleological action as ‘values-driven’ wherein a person acts 
because he or she judges their action to be ‘good, right, required by duty or supported by 
reasons’ (ibid: 158). Values-driven behaviour means acting out of values, as distinct from 
fitting values to goal-directed activity. Given this, whole purpose will include collective actions 
which are both goal-directed and values-driven. In organisations with a well-developed ethical 
capacity, these collective actions are generated through deliberation and contestation over 
values which promote the local good for worthy objects, and where local objectives are nested 
into higher purposes. Hence meaningfulness becomes a possibility only inside action itself 
where people wrestle together with objectively valuable purposes, turning them into meanings, 
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values, goals, activities, tasks, feelings, judgements and outcomes.   In other words, local 
organisational purposes are socially constructed through purposing, which engages the 
attentions and capabilities of all affected stakeholders by involving them with independently 
valuable objects. Hence, organisational purposing is a social achievement arising from mutual 
organisation, where mutuality provides a relational, values-rich and pragmatic philosophy for 
designing institutions constituted by the value of meaningfulness.   
 
Local and Ultimate Purpose  
In a critical theory of the corporation, the ultimate purpose of the organisation is to contribute 
to the common good upon which individual flourishing, in all its variety, depends, and in so 
doing to generate goods individuals may incorporate into a life they have reason to value. The 
common good is not the general will, nor is it the aggregation or sum of separate goods. Rather, 
it is the ‘the realisation of the human capacity for intrinsically valuable relationships’ 
(Hollenbach, 2002: 81), through which we ‘act […] together for the sake of mutual benefits’ 
(Jordan, 1989: 16). O’Brien (2009) argues that the common good consists of: firstly, an ordered 
arrangement of individual goods, and secondly, an ultimate goal towards which the ordered 
arrangement aims. For Kennedy (2007), the common good is an instrumental rather than a final 
good: it is ‘not a final good valued in and for itself (as basic goods are, for example), but it is 
something valued, supported and protected by the members of the society for what it permits 
them to do and to be’ (ibid.). By means of the common good we produce the ‘life capabilities’ 
upon which each person depends for their survival and their flourishing (McMurtry, 2002). 
McMurtry argues that ‘human beings are value-bearing beings, and their ultimate ground of 
value is life itself’ (ibid: 55). They are also value-creators, and thereby co-authors and co-
sustainers of positive values. Hence, in a critical theory of the corporation where normative 
content is supplied by the intrinsic worth of members, the purpose of organisational activity is 
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to provide the common resources for life capabilities which confirm our status as value-bearing 
beings, and enable us to fulfil our responsibilities for creating and sustaining value.  
This understanding of the common good requires organisations to attend to the ‘variety and 
plurality in relationships and associations among its members’ (Kennedy, 2007), out of which 
we construct lives we have reason to value. However, Naughton et al. (1995) identify the risks 
in the common good tradition ‘of seeking unity at the expense of diversity, solidarity at the 
expense of opposition, and community at the expense of individuality, all of which eventually 
undermine the common good’ (ibid: 233). Conversely, the common good which respects the 
dignity of particular persons with lives of their own to lead is dependent upon the creation and 
maintenance of value pluralism, where productive value pluralism is the collective work of 
persons who are related to one another through associational belonging. These associations of 
belonging are the many economic and social organisations which not only produce the 
individual goods we need for living a decent life, but are also sources of positive values for the 
construction of personal meaning. The whole purpose of an organisation consists in the 
contribution that its production and distribution of individual goods makes to the common 
good, where production and distribution includes ‘purposing’, a social practice which seeks to 
maintain a resource of positive values and promote deliberation over meanings and differences. 
Through purposing, we engage in world-building which issues in the creation and maintenance 
of the values and goods we appropriate to the meaningfulness of our lives. 
  
Organisational Purposing  
Organisational purposes are not given automatically but emerge from collective judging, 
feeling and acting. In a critical conception of the corporation which aims at increasing ethical 
capacity as the means for attending to intrinsic worth, purposing is not the sole province of a 
managerial elite to whom other stakeholders alienate their sensemaking responsibilities 
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(Tourish, 2010). Rather, purposing requires mutual engagement between multiple stakeholders 
who generate interpretive differences over purpose, values and meanings in the midst of acting 
together. Mutuality as an organising philosophy generates institutional spaces for deliberative 
engagement with values pluralism inside acts of work. Honneth (2007) describes how an 
‘undistorted act of work’, which is ‘complete in itself’ (ibid: 45), arises when workers engage 
in a ‘process of emancipatory reflection’ (ibid: 47). In such acts of work, whole purpose 
emerges as workers struggle to unite means and ends through the interaction with objects and 
with others. This demands that workers engage with the dilemmas and contradictions of their 
collective actions, giving rise to interpretive differences in purposes, values and meanings. 
However, these interpretive differences will remain as pre-political potentials unless they are 
made productive through public deliberation (Yeoman, 2014a). Mutuality is the means for 
institutionalising a voice system in which purposing is productive of emancipatory potentials.   
  
The Importance of Value Pluralism for Organisational Purposing  
Purposing in normatively productive organisations depends upon value pluralism, or a 
common resource of positive values which organisational members may incorporate into the 
meaningfulness of their lives. Value pluralism is a fact about organisations which is often 
regarded as a problem to be tamed or even eliminated, rather than a potentially productive 
resource for organisational development and human emancipation. Heath et al (2009) point to 
already existing value pluralism in firms which, given the global reach of many organisations, 
means that they now ‘reflect the pluralism of the surrounding society’ (ibid: 9). Consequently, 
‘disagreement can not be expected to go away simply through persuasion, better education or 
improved deliberative conditions’ (ibid.). Rather, Heath et al (2009) argue, we need to engage 
in the search for normative principles suitable for governing corporations beyond personal 
moral commitments. Yet, this collective search is unlikely to be successful if our personal 
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commitments and values are ignored, silenced, marginalised or suppressed. Instead, general 
normative principles for morally permissible organising will emerge from an expanded ‘moral 
space’ for workers (Blanc, 2014), and for stakeholders more broadly, ‘to make their work part 
of their lived conception of the good’ (ibid: 473), where value pluralism is maintained and 
protected as a vital resource for creating meaningfulness. This means that organisations seeking 
to develop their ethical capacity need to establish social practices which create opportunities 
for stakeholders to engage productively with value pluralism. In turn, these opportunities must 
be structured by relationships which meet certain normative standards, such as mutual respect 
and attention to difference, as well as recognition of inter-dependence and shared vulnerability. 
Indeed, Neron (2015) argues that the justice of relationships may matter more than the justice 
of distribution, where the quality of relationships between persons and organisations is assessed 
by ‘relational egalitarianism’. In a theoretical integration of meaningfulness and mutuality, 
Neron’s ‘relational egalitarianism’ is constituted by our status as co-authorities in meaning 
making; that is, by our equal authority to speak and to act through institutionally embedded 
voice practices. Thus, relational egalitarianism is a feature of the relational quality needed for 
elevated ethical capacity, as well as the formation of capabilities needed to become valuers. 
 
Becoming a Valuer  
Becoming a valuer is a developmental process. Ikaheimo (2007) identifies two dimensions 
of personhood we would want to recognise in social life: firstly, ‘the interpersonal status of 
being respected as a co-authority’ and ‘psychological capacities for norm-administration’ (ibid:  
36), and secondly, the values, relations, states of affairs such that ‘caring about the happiness 
or good life of oneself/others is a structuring principle’ (ibid.). We express our personhood as 
bearers of values and as norm-administrators through associational belonging, where we 
encounter objects with independent value, and act to promote their good. In collective action, 
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these interactions generate struggles over how to get the work done (Dejours, 2006), producing 
interpretive differences over meanings and values which remain marginalised or silenced 
unless activated through deliberation. In ‘participatory sense-making’, people ‘intertwine their 
sense-making activities, with consequences for each other in the process, in the form of the 
interactional generation of new meanings and the transformation of existing meanings’ (Di 
Paolo et al, 2010: 71-72). These interpretive differences will remain as pre-political potentials 
unless they are made productive through institutional mechanisms for voice, such as 
representation and participation. This implies the need for deliberative capabilities, exercised 
through processes of interaction which produce, maintain and promote values. In normatively 
productive organisations which respect intrinsic worth such interactions will take place through 
relationships with specific ethical characteristics. I argue that these ethical characteristics are 
supplied by mutuality as an organising philosophy.  
Moreover, correctly structured relationships support our status as co-authorities in the realm 
of value (Yeoman, 2015). If we are to contribute our differences, and render them productive 
for organisational purposing and acting, we need to see ourselves as equal participants entitled 
to involve ourselves in the creation, interpretation and maintenance of meanings. This requires 
not only the public acknowledgement of our status as value-bearers, but also the personal 
experience of feeling ourselves worthy of speaking and being listened to. Both status and a 
sense of self-worth are needed to participate in world-making which contributes to our being 
able to experience our lives as meaningful: ‘human beings denied the opportunity to exercise 
their world-building capacities live an impoverished life, a life that is somehow less human, a 
life without freedom, without happiness’ (Honig, 1993: 112). Potentially, all persons possess 
the capabilities for meaningfulness, including being able to appreciate, engage with, and 
produce values, provided that they are also afforded the status as co-authorities in the realm of 
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value. This status is manifested when organisations promote a type of authority in conceiving, 
speaking and negotiating which Tirrell (1993) identifies as the ‘power of naming’ (Daly, 1973:  
9). Such authority allows us to engage in ‘the distinctively human activity of defining, 
describing, and re-creating ourselves while simultaneously defining, describing and re-creating 
our social and material world’ (Tirrell, 1993: 2). In order to participate in activities of meaning 
making which produce the world, then we require ‘semantic authority’ which is ‘a matter of 
having a say (about something) that others recognize and respect; it is an important, perhaps 
necessary, element in constructing oneself as fully human’ (ibid: 16). Tirrell argues that 
becoming valuers depends upon our membership of communities because ‘our past actions and 
the actions of others establish a structure of significance’ (ibid: 13), and also because 
communities provide a structure of meaning, which ‘give our articulations ‘uptake’’ (ibid: 15). 
Relational conditions in organisational life can be such that interpretive differences often lie 
fallow, even when they are urgently needed to illuminate collective dysfunctions, such as 
organisational silence.  
Organisational silence arises from ‘shared beliefs about the danger and/or futility of 
speaking up through processes of information sharing, social contagion and collective sense-
making’ (Milliken at al., 2003: 1456-7). In normatively productive organisations, 
organisational silence is avoided when interpretive differences are invited as part of 
collaborative knowledge building and mutual learning which is aimed at promoting the good 
for worthy objects, for the sake of which the organisation exists. Under such arrangements, 
giving one’s difference is expressively human, and even a duty laid upon each member (Follett, 
1998 [1918]).  Mutuality as an organising philosophy provides the values, principles and 
practices needed to make the invitation to contribute one’s difference both safe and viable.  
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MUTUALITY – AN ORGANISING PHILOSOPHY  
I argue that mutual organisation is key to unlocking the value of meaningfulness. This is 
because mutuality specifies how we are to relate to one another, requiring that intersubjective 
encounters be grounded in our intrinsic worth as value-bearers and value-creators. In order to 
describe mutuality as an organising philosophy, I turn to Rawls’s (1999) Theory of Justice. In 
the Rawlsian schema, the basic structure of society is just when it is organised to the mutual 
advantage of all. When the basic structure embodies the values of equality and freedom to the 
maximal degree then people will be free to live according their own ideas of the good. Rawls 
acknowledges that ‘society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage’ (Rawls, 1999 TJ: 
456) is marked by conflict as well as common interests, but the ultimate goal of cooperation is 
a ‘social union’ in a Humboldtian sense (TJ: 459) which is the ‘shared final end’ of the 
‘successful carrying out of just institutions’ (TJ: 461-2).    
Drawing upon Rawlsian themes, I understand mutuality to be an organising principle for 
producing correctly ordered institutional arrangements which attend to our intrinsic worth. As 
such, mutual organisation is the proving ground for the formation and exercise of the 
capabilities for meaningfulness, allowing us to express our human dignity as particular persons 
with lives of our own to lead. Voice is the core practice for mutual organisation, where voice 
enables us to not only ‘express an opinion or participate in decision-making’ (Lavelle et al, 
2010), but also to have a share of decision making power. As a consequence of appropriately 
aligned purposes, values and practices - in particular, the core practice of voice - the 
institutional features of mutual organisation become conducive to promoting the value of 
meaningfulness.   
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The Principle of Mutuality  
Mutuality is a philosophy which describes how we are to live with one another.  The 
Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary defines ‘mutual’ as ‘interchanged, reciprocal, given 
and received, common, joint, shared by two or more’, and ‘mutualism’ as the ‘theory that 
mutual dependence is necessary for the welfare of the individual and society’. The etymological 
root of mutuality is mūtāre, the Latin verb ‘to change’, or ‘to change oneself into’. Furthermore, 
this change is interactive, involving something with is ‘felt or done by each to the other’ 
(Oxford Concise Dictionary of English Etymology). The primary ethical principle of mutuality 
is the Golden Rule or Law of Moral Reciprocity which Gewirth (1978) describes as: ‘Do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you’ (Gewirth, 1978).  The reciprocal interactions at 
the heart of the concept makes mutuality fundamentally relational. As such, the ethical content 
of mutuality is concerned with the values, principles and practices which specify the conditions 
under which we are prepared to join our effort to those of others in order to secure together 
what one cannot secure alone. In our critical conception of the corporation, mutual organisation 
is made to serve the normative standard of intrinsic worth, measured against relational quality, 
and aimed at the emancipatory object of human development. Thus, mutual organisation must 
be concerned with justice in the production and distribution of the resources and capabilities 
we need for human development, where justice is understood as:  
‘[…] how the good and bad things in life should be distributed among the members of 
a human society. When more concretely, we attack some policy or some state of affairs 
as socially unjust, we are claiming that a person, or more usually a category of persons, 
enjoys fewer advantages than that person or group of persons ought to enjoy (or bears 
more of the burdens than they ought to bear), given how other members of the society 
in question are faring.’ (Miller, 1999:1)  
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Drawing upon theories of social justice, the objective of mutual organisation is to distribute 
amongst all affected stakeholders a fair share of the benefits and burdens arising from their 
shared activities. In a mutual organisation, distribution is determined through fair procedures 
in which all affected stakeholders have a voice in influencing the rules governing such 
distributions, and furthermore are invested with joint control rights in determining the purposes 
and actions of the organisation, where joint does not imply a mere similarity of interests, but 
rather a substantive unity of two or more diverse parts which maintain their distinctiveness. 
Institutionally embedded voice practices makes it more likely that collective action in the 
production of local and ultimate goods - for the sake of which the organisation exists - will be 
arranged to respect the intrinsic worth of organisational members, understood as their dignity 
as particular persons with lives of their own to lead (Yeoman, 2014a). Through the practices of 
mutual organisation, collective activities may be arranged to enact human values of respect, 
dignity and meaningfulness, as well as to produce outcomes consistent with societal, 
organisational and stakeholder flourishing.  
Mutuality becomes morally relevant under the everyday constraints which result from living 
together under Hume’s ‘circumstances of justice’ (1896); that is, when our human interactions 
are characterised by moderate scarcity and limited altruism.  When faced with finite time, 
resources, talent and effort, how are we to be successful in our plans for living? Throughout 
our lives, we suffer from, but are also nourished by, constraints to our agency – as children, we 
require nurturing care from others to survive and grow; as adults, we must participate with 
others in political, social and economic cooperation, relying upon them for numerous services 
if our lives are to go well. When coercion is prohibited, we must establish a system of social 
cooperation in which we share with others the production of the goods and services we need, 
motivated not only by extrinsic reward but also the intrinsic satisfactions of joint action. The 
production and maintenance of goods is secured through ordered social relationships which are 
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themselves amongst the goods we have reason to value and seek to incorporate into the 
meaningfulness of our lives. In normatively productive organisations, these relationships have 
specific characteristics which underpin our status as co-authorities in the realm of value. These 
characteristics are: interdependence (unavoidable for living a decent human life), inclusiveness  
(‘all affected’), cooperation (vital for coordination and a sense of solidarity and belonging), and 
human values (equality, fairness, care, respect, esteem and dignity). Mutual relations underpin 
the procedures which determine the distribution of burdens and benefits, where procedures are 
judged to be more or less fair based upon comparisons with fairness norms and principles, 
including the extent to which all affected stakeholders have a share in influencing the rules 
governing their collective actions.   
However, not all mutual relationships are normatively productive. Altruism and mutualism 
are two kinds of cooperative relations, where altruism is more costly for the recipient than for 
the actor, and mutualism is beneficial to both the actor and the recipient (Baumer & Sperber, 
2013). In a further elaboration, constrained mutualism can be distinguished from substantive 
mutualism. In constrained mutualism, the benefits to one party are so minimal that he or she 
remains in a condition of permanent dependence, gaining little opportunity for capacity 
development or even a minimally decent life. Constrained mutualism renders a recipient 
vulnerable to exploitative exchanges when the recipient has few options for exit since ‘almost 
anything is better than being left without a social interaction at all’ (Baumard & Spicer, 2013: 
62). Individuals faced with unacceptable conditions of social organisation may not be able to 
exit (Hirschman, 1970), and even if they do, their society may not be able to offer a sufficiently 
enriching alternative choice set. The difficulty of exit and constrained life options gives rise to 
a moral dilemma for normatively productive organisations which are attentive to the intrinsic 
worth of their stakeholders. This dilemma is the harm done to self-respect by exploitative 
voluntary exchanges (Sample, 2003). Snyder (2013) considers the problem of mutual benefits 
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arising when people freely enter into relations which bring them benefits but where those 
relations are selected from a choice set so impoverished that the chooser cannot experience 
adequate human development. When an offer ‘does not allow the recipient sufficient progress 
toward a decent minimum of human functioning’ (ibid: 346), then the recipient’s participation 
in the interaction has a ‘demeaning quality, creating a form of ‘surface endorsement’ of the 
treatment she receives (ibid: 353). Even though acceptance of the benefits is uncoerced, the 
damage to the recipient’s human dignity is not remedied by the degree of benefit. Despite this, 
Arneson (2013) suggests that we may not want to forgo the benefits to the recipient, which may 
result in worse consequences than damage to the recipient’s dignity, such as life threatening 
poverty. One way through this dilemma is to consider how voluntary but exploitative exchanges 
can be consciously embedded in long term relationships of mutual obligation, where the aim is 
to shift the system to greater productivity through social practices based upon voice and power-
sharing. The object would be to secure distribution of the value created through human 
capability guarantees which seek to expand available life options.  
This suggests a role for substantive mutuality in innovation, where substantive mutuality is 
understood to be established within networks of enduring obligations. Although stable and 
possibly long lasting, particularly when backed up by the force of law and social norms, 
constrained mutuality lacks dynamism, diminishing institutional vitality by stifling information 
flows and fostering dysfunctional capability formation. This means that constrained mutuality 
may result in long-term harms to both actor and recipient because repression and control are 
costly and crowd out innovation (Snyder, 2013). Sufficiency in the distribution of benefits may 
depend upon non-exploitative relations or voice practices. Essentially, mutual relations 
establish the fruitful conditions for people to come together to deliberate over their higher 
purpose, to judge whether that purpose is good, and to agree the means through which they will 
work together to achieve that purpose. Carlton & Lad (1995) describe a process of ‘micro social 
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contracting’ at an organisational level ‘by which participants in a network define themselves 
and the meaning of their collective enterprise through the interactive pattern of joint rulemaking 
that governs the common effort’ (Carlton & Lad, 1995: 278). Such processes provide 
opportunities for stakeholders to develop collective intentions for joint action which provide 
the background for the long term interactions needed to move organisational activities from 
exploitive exchanges in constrained mutuality to joint flourishing in substantive mutualism  
  
Mutuality as a Practical Ethic  
In my outline of a critical conception of the corporation, relational quality provides the 
standard for assessing positive or negative states of affairs. Drawing upon Rawls’s Theory of 
Justice, I argue that relational quality is secured through the manifestation of three dimensions 
of mutuality, where each dimension is associated with an ethical orientation and principle. 
These dimensions are: bargaining (associated with fairness and reciprocity); cooperating 
(associated with care and contribution); and becoming (associated with flourishing and world 
building). I posit that the dimensions of mutuality will be enacted to a greater or lesser degree, 
and therefore be more or less promoting of meaningfulness, to the extent that voice forms the 
core organisational practice. The voice architecture of mutual organisation mitigates the moral 
harms related to each dimension of mutuality. In bargaining, the rules of the game can operate 
to the advantage of some who are able to appropriate the benefits of bargaining with no regard 
for the welfare of the disadvantaged (exploitation); in cooperating, people can be disengaged 
or disaffected in relations vital to their well-being such as their work, their colleagues, their 
sense of self, their organisation (alienation); in becoming, people can find that domination and 
alienation distort their abilities to meet their fundamental needs for agency and self-
determination, making them vulnerable to exploitation (capability deformation). The 
dimensions of mutuality are laid out in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Dimensions of Mutuality  
 




Key Principle    
Bargaining  Fairness  Exploitation  Reciprocity  
  
What do I lack which 
you can provide?  
Cooperating  Care  Alienation  Contribution  What can I contribute 




Flourishing  Capability 
Deformation  
World-Building  What I need for acting 
and being I recognise 
you need also  
  
 
Rawls describes a progressive modus vivendi, or a way of living with diversity and 
difference, which we can interpret as moving from bargaining to cooperating, and finally, to 
flourishing. Society advances from bargaining behind the veil of ignorance, where people who 
are ignorant of their eventual position in the future society reason together under conditions of 
impartiality and fairness in order to create the social contract which will govern the future 
society, to cooperating in the social system which produces the primary goods which ‘every 
rational man is presumed to want’ (TJ: 54), to becoming in a ‘social union’ (TJ: 459) which is 
the ‘shared final end’ of the ‘successful carrying out of just institutions’ (TJ: 461-2). The 
dimensions of mutuality are cumulative, building upon each other as society becomes more 
complex, but at the same time generating variation in the kinds of lives people can choose to 
lead. Behind the veil of ignorance people act towards one another with mutual impartiality and 
reciprocity. They bargain with one another to establish the rules which are to guide their 
interactions in the future society. Once the veil has been lifted, people voluntarily enter into the 
system of social cooperation which is ‘a cooperative venture for mutual advantage’ (Rawls, 
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1999 TJ: 456), which, in order to sustain the production of primary goods each one needs to 
pursue her conception of living, depends upon each person fulfilling her natural duties of 
mutual respect and mutual aid. In addition, individual conceptions of living must interlock 
through association, sociability and the enjoyment of one another’s excellences in a social 
union. Even though Rawls’s object is to establish the terms for a stable system of fair 
cooperation which will endure across generations, the social union is always in a process of 
becoming, such that each person’s development is necessary for the development of all, giving 
rise to a mutuality of increasing and enriching excellences, and forming the basis for respect 
recognition upon which self-respect, Rawls’s most important primary good, depends.   
  
Bargaining and Fairness  
Through bargaining, we determine the rules governing collective action in a system of social 
cooperation. Bargaining situations, however, are frequently characterised by asymmetric power 
relations, rendering participants vulnerable to exploitative exchanges, and giving rise to 
perceptions of unfairness. A practical ethic of mutuality addresses the moral concern of 
exploitation by establishing procedures, distributions and interactions consistent with fairness 
norms and principles. Phillips (1997) describes the principle of fairness in stakeholder relations 
as:   
‘Whenever persons or groups of persons voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutually 
beneficial scheme of co-operation requiring sacrifice or contribution on the parts of the 
participants and there exists the possibility of free-riding obligations of fairness are created 
among the participants in the co-operative scheme in proportion to the benefits accepted’ 
(Phillips, 1997: 57).  
Although a sense of fairness may be universal, interpretations of fairness are contextual and 
socially constructed by background norms, values and cultural expectations. Empirical studies 
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of fairness principles in human action indicate that individuals often favour collections of 
fairness principles, prioritising or combining them according to their circumstances (see 
Konow, 2003). Furthermore, positive fairness perceptions depend upon inclusive social 
practices for conciliating difference. Sen (2009) makes democratic participation central to 
creating a public space for decision-making around values and politics: ‘when we try to 
determine how justice can be advanced, there is a basic need for public reasoning, including 
arguments coming  from different quarters and divergent perspectives’ (ibid: 392). This extends 
to our capacity to influence the social arrangements in which we live our lives, including our 
involvement in creating ‘fair agreements’ (Christiano 2013). Christiano argues that fairness 
exists to the extent that ‘each person [has] a voice in how to construct the social world they live 
in, and it leaves to each party how to conceive of what the content of a fair agreement is to be’ 
(ibid.). Christiano picks out two core human interests which are met by such a notion of 
fairness. Firstly, our interest in avoiding alienation, which is met by ‘being at home in the 
world’ (ibid: 375). Secondly, our interest in having our particular concerns, needs and plans for 
living recognised in circumstances which protect us against the cognitive biases of others. This 
is met by ‘participating in shaping my world’ (ibid.). Thus, social practices promoting non-
alienation (cooperating) and world-building (becoming) are vital to our being able to join our 
efforts to those of others under conditions which are consistent with our status as co-authorities 
where ‘the moral importance of each person having the power to shape their cooperative 
relations with others’ which go beyond ‘mere coordination’ (ibid: 372).   
  
Cooperating and Care  
Mutual relationships constituted by fairness provide the necessary foundation for a system 
of social cooperation which produces local goods. However, they are not sufficient for the 
creation of the common good which is the ultimate purpose of organising. Thus, intuitions of 
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fair play may lead people to promote a strict reciprocal exchange, which may nonetheless 
transgress other meanings of mutuality grounded in solidarity, friendship or care. As Goodin 
(2002) points out:  
‘[G]iving you back the same Christmas gift that you gave me earlier in the day may 
constitute a paradigm case of lock step reciprocity – but it is definitely not a friendly 
gesture. If what we want norms of reciprocity to do for us, in part, is to bind us together 
in a ‘community of shared fate’ then that form of reciprocity is actually contra-indicated’ 
(Goodin, 2002).   
The long term maintenance of a system of social cooperation depends upon sentiments of 
loyalty, attachment and fellow feeling. If we are to cultivate the requisite moral sentiments in 
the organisations which constitute the ‘social union’, we must attend to relational quality as an 
aspect of the ethical capacity of normatively productive organisations. Correctly structured 
mutual relationships foster acts of solidarity, where ‘solidarity requires that one enters into the 
situation of those with whom one is solidary’ (Freire, 1970: 31). In specifying the normative 
characteristics of cooperative relations in joint activities, Bratman (1992) says that ‘shared 
cooperative activity involves appropriately interlocking and reflexive systems of mutually 
uncoerced intentions concerning the joint activity’ (ibid: 336), where cooperative activity is 
characterised by: mutual responsiveness; commitment to the joint activity; and commitment to 
mutual support (ibid: 328). He adds that mutual responsiveness occurs in circumstances where 
‘I will be trying to be responsive to your intentions and actions, knowing that you will be trying 
to be responsive to my intentions and actions, and arises out of the commitment each has to the 
joint activity’. Commitment to the joint activity motivates each person to be mutually 
supportive of the other in ‘playing her role in the joint activity’ (ibid: 328). Cooperation is 
therefore unavoidable. However, cooperation cannot be elicited through coercion or 
manipulations; rather, we must invite cooperation in a ‘moral way’ (Courpasson & Dany, 2003: 
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1232). This means that cooperation must be characterised by mutual relations which are 
voluntary, foster mutual recognition and self-respect, employ complex capabilities and are 
directed at worthwhile purposes.   
Care ethicists argue that standard theories of justice are limited by their requirement for 
impartiality in reason giving and the adoption of a hyper-individualist ontology. Consequently, 
they are not able to account for the particularity of our commitments, the importance of our 
relationships and the manner in which relations of power determine the distribution of benefits 
and burdens. Conversely, an ethical orientation of care, based upon a relational ontology,  
‘conceives agents as mutually interconnected, vulnerable and dependent, often in asymmetrical 
ways’ (Pettersen, 2011: 52) where moral agents are understood to be ‘entrenched in a web of 
relationships’ (ibid: 55; see also, Held, 2005). This is useful for evaluating what is at stake in 
social cooperation where moral agents take up responsibilities in contexts characterised by 
power asymmetries, making us vulnerable to one another through unavoidable inter-
dependencies. In mutual organisation, caring orientations allied to voice practices enable us to 
fulfil our responsibilities towards worthy objects; make our contribution to the production local 
and ultimate goods; and attend to power relations.   
  
Becoming and Flourishing  
Bargaining initiates a system of social cooperation, and cooperating stabilises collective 
action, but neither alone produce the transformations required to elevate a cooperative system 
to a new equilibrium capable of generating higher levels of fairness and care. For this, we 
require the additional dimension of becoming. Becoming draws upon the etymological root of 
mūtāre as change, mutation and mutability. Within a mutable organisation, the ultimate end or 
telos remains permanently available for contestation and revision. Mutual relations are shaped 
by processes of change, evolution and adaptation - although plasticity is constrained by the 
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normative requirements of relational quality. Using the evolutionary metaphor, these 
developmental relationships allow for the possibility of chance and difference, and are open to 
the novel, unexpected and original. However, unlike the evolutionary metaphor, mutuality as 
becoming is a normative ideal which selects novelties, innovations and adaptations for their 
capacity to orient us to some moral good. In other words, mutuality as becoming does not aim 
at anything whatsoever, but at the realisation of the common good through orientations of 
fairness, care and flourishing. This suggests organisations existing in a perpetual condition of  
‘becoming’ which Tsoukas & Chia (2002) describe as ‘an attempt to order the intrinsic flux of 
human action, to channel it towards certain ends, to give it a particular shape, through 
generalizing and institutionalizing particular meanings and rules’ (ibid: 570). Carlsen (2006) 
relates organisational becoming to acting in work, and defines organisational becoming as the  
‘set of ongoing authoring acts situated in everyday work’. At an individual level, becoming is 
a form of ‘life enrichment’ involving a quest for wholeness and unity. Thus one of the purposes 
of organisations is the search for collective identity, generous enough to incorporate 
stakeholder plurality, and stable enough to provide values and meanings for institutional 
formation (ibid: 134).  
However, change is not automatically beneficial for all stakeholders. Mutual change – 
change for mutual advantage - can be thought of as the equal participation of all in creating a 
shared world which benefits all its members. Sherman (1993) argues that one of the reasons we 
engage with others in common pursuit is ‘we simply value doing things for their own sake’.  
This is because ‘we value creating a shared world and the mutuality that is defined by our 
interactions. The pleasure of mutuality at the expansion of self that comes with it is part of 
human flourishing’ (ibid.).  Mutuality in world-building, or mutuality as becoming, requires us 
to participate in meaning-making, out of which emerges the norms, behaviours, systems and 
processes necessary for the common life. By inter-relating through shared endeavour, we create 
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‘a sense of tracking something with one another, of creating a sense of unity through attunement 
to each other other’s moves’ (ibid). This mutual joining of mind, feeling and effort is not fully 
described by fairness or even care; rather it is a dynamic interaction which creates a temporary 
sense of unity between two or more individuals engaged in a common purpose but which is 
more likely to arise in action contexts characterised by fairness and care. Furthermore, such 
experiences are highly productive of meaningfulness, with similar features to 
Csikszentmihalyi's (1991) immersive experience of ‘flow’. Mary Parker Follett (1918) 
describes the experience of community group work as one which aims neither at compromise 
nor consensus, but at an integration of the differences which individuals bring to their 
interrelatedness. For Follett, power in moments of genuine integration is not coercion or even 
a balance of power, but is coactive power (power with) in which all share in the production and 
the enjoyment of the outcome.  
  
Meaningfulness and Mutuality in a Critical Conception of the Corporation  
At last, by bringing together meaningful ‘flow’ experiences with coactive power, we have 
reached the heart of the matter. This is because meaninglessness and powerlessness go hand-
in-glove. Organisations with reduced ethical capacities for respecting intrinsic worth are power-
degraded, and consequently meaning deprived. Such a condition arises when an elite group or 
single person capture and unify power without regard for the ethical purpose of the organisation 
to contribute to the common good and the production of local goods. Clegg et al (2006) 
comment that ‘power without morality is despotism, while morality without power is sterile’ 
(ibid: 384). To counteract such dangers, we need to create power-full organisations which 
attend to ‘the combination of democracy, power and morality’ (ibid) through the institution of 
a plurality of power sources. Such organisations, when held together by overlapping values, as 
well as checks and balances in a polyarchic system of accountability, are mutual organisations.   
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Power-full organisations disperse meaning-making capabilities, making each member a co-
authority in the realm of value. They are enabled to do so in organisations characterised by high 
levels of relational quality, enacted through voice practices. In her philosophical revival of the 
concept of alienation,  Jaeggi (2014) describes alienation as ‘a relation of relationlessness’ 
(ibid. original emphasis), where alienation is a radically deficient relationship which is 
overcome by creating relations of appropriation, or ‘productive relations, as open processes in 
which appropriation always means both the integration and transformation of what is given’ 
(ibid.) . She argues that alienation from our own activity, and from the world we have made, is 
marked by meaninglessness and powerlessness: ‘the ability meaningfully to identify with what 
one does and with those with whom one does it’ and ‘the inability to exert control over what 
one does – that is, the inability to be, individually or collectively, the subject of one’s actions’ 
(ibid). In our critical conception of the corporation, meaningfulness is restored through mutual 
organisation which refuses alienation of meaning-making capacities, making us jointly 
responsible for one another, and the common good upon which we all depend.  
In sum, normatively productive organisations which are capable of positive transformations 
in the human condition are values-generative and purpose-oriented. Consistent with mutuality 
as an organising philosophy, they exhibit high levels of ethical capacity which includes 
relational quality, deliberative voice and value pluralism. They contribute to the ultimate 
purpose of inclusive flourishing through the co-creation of the common good which 
accumulates through cycles of local purposing and the production of individual goods (material 
and immaterial). Drawing upon mutuality, these cycles are characterised by a movement from 
bargaining to cooperating to becoming, at both an organisational and a system level, stimulated 
by voice practices involving many stakeholders in the joint determination of rules and 
collection actions. Institutionally embedded voice practices proliferate the experience of 
meaningfulness by actively engaging people in objects which matter, which have significance 
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beyond the individual. Finally, the extent to which meaningfulness and mutuality can be judged 
to be manifested in organisations provides the standard and normative content for a critical 
conception of the corporation which seeks to address contemporary concerns that organisations 
lack ethical capacity sufficient to play their part in solving the many challenges of an 
increasingly complex and interconnected world.  
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